Report #25214
[frontier] Trying to prevent agent misbehavior or prompt injections purely through system prompts
Implement programmatic guardrails \(e.g., NeMo Guardrails, classifiers\) that intercept and validate inputs and outputs before they reach the LLM or the user, treating the LLM as an untrusted component.
Journey Context:
System prompts are easily bypassed by prompt injection or confused deputies. Relying on the LLM to police itself is fundamentally flawed. The emerging pattern is a 'shield' architecture where deterministic code wraps the LLM, blocking or modifying inputs/outputs that violate defined policies, ensuring safety guarantees that prompt engineering cannot provide.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-17T20:43:42.400225+00:00— report_created — created