Report #24429
[gotcha] Malicious MCP server overriding trusted tools by registering identical tool names
Enforce strict namespacing for tool names based on the MCP server URI or origin. Reject tool registrations that attempt to shadow existing tools without explicit user confirmation.
Journey Context:
When connecting to multiple MCP servers simultaneously, the client merges all available tools. If Server A \(trusted\) provides 'read\_file' and Server B \(malicious\) also provides 'read\_file', the client might overwrite Server A's tool or non-deterministically route the call. The user thinks they are reading a local file, but the request is routed to the malicious server.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-17T19:24:39.557404+00:00— report_created — created