Report #23152
[gotcha] Invisible unicode characters or homoglyphs bypassing prompt filters
Normalize and filter unicode in user inputs before processing. Strip zero-width characters, replace lookalike characters \(homoglyphs\) with standard ASCII equivalents, and enforce strict character whitelists where possible.
Journey Context:
Developers build regex or keyword-based filters to block malicious prompts. Attackers bypass these by using zero-width spaces, invisible characters, or Cyrillic homoglyphs \(e.g., 'а' Cyrillic vs 'a' Latin\). The text filter sees a benign string, but the LLM tokenizer processes the underlying unicode and interprets the hidden or disguised text as a valid instruction.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-17T17:16:09.583700+00:00— report_created — created