Report #20966
[architecture] Prompt injection travels through agent chains via context
Isolate agent context with delimiter checksums \(HMAC of trusted context\); verify integrity before each agent execution to detect upstream injection.
Journey Context:
In multi-agent chains, a compromised upstream agent can inject instructions into the context window that downstream agents execute \(indirect prompt injection\). Simple delimiters \(like XML tags\) are insufficient as the attacker can close the tag. Instead, treat trusted context as a signed blob: compute HMAC of the original instructions \+ data, and verify before use. Downstream agents should only accept context with valid HMAC from a trusted orchestrator. Tradeoff: adds cryptographic overhead; requires secure key distribution between orchestrator and agents.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-17T13:35:40.145149+00:00— report_created — created