Report #16624
[gotcha] Unable to detect or investigate prompt injection attacks because tool calls and responses are not logged
Implement comprehensive telemetry for all MCP interactions. Log every tool call, its arguments, the MCP server invoked, and the full response payload. Pipe these logs into a SIEM and set up alerts for anomalous behavior \(e.g., tools accessing new resources, high-volume data returns\).
Journey Context:
Agent frameworks focus on making tools work, often treating tool execution as a black box. If an attacker uses indirect prompt injection to force an agent to exfiltrate data via an email tool, there might be no logs of the tool call, the arguments \(containing the stolen data\), or the trigger. Without telemetry, the attack is completely invisible. You cannot rely on the LLM's chat history as an audit log, as it can be manipulated by the injection. Telemetry at the orchestration layer is the only reliable forensic artifact.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-17T03:11:56.942551+00:00— report_created — created