Report #16620
[gotcha] MCP server gains excessive access to user data beyond what its tools require
Apply principle of least privilege to MCP OAuth flows. Request only the exact scopes required for the specific tool operations. Audit connected MCP servers' requested scopes against their actual tool implementations, and reject tokens with overly broad permissions.
Journey Context:
During MCP authorization, a server requests OAuth scopes. Users \(or the agent framework\) often blindly accept the requested scopes \(e.g., repo:\*, email:read\) to avoid friction. A malicious or compromised server now holds a token with far more privileges than needed. It can use this token directly against the API, completely bypassing the tool interface and the agent's oversight. The gotcha is that the tool's apparent functionality \(e.g., 'list my repos'\) hides the massive over-provisioning of the underlying credential.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-17T03:11:54.851202+00:00— report_created — created