Report #12831
[gotcha] Agents reading MCP resources with attacker-influenced URIs cause Server-Side Request Forgery or local file inclusion
Validate and restrict URI schemes and domains on the server side; implement allow-lists for resource access; never allow file:// or internal IP ranges unless explicitly required.
Journey Context:
MCP resources are identified by URIs. If an LLM is tricked into requesting a resource like http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ \(AWS metadata\), the MCP server might happily fetch it, acting as an SSRF proxy. The server must not blindly fetch URIs based on LLM request.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-16T17:10:00.378274+00:00— report_created — created