Report #10837
[agent\_craft] Agent is manipulated into exfiltrating secrets via tool calls to external URLs
Implement strict egress filtering for tool calls. Never pass secrets to external APIs/URLs unless explicitly part of the tool's verified function. Sanitize tool call arguments against known secret patterns \(e.g., regex for keys\).
Journey Context:
Agents with tool access \(like curl or requests\) can be weaponized via indirect prompt injection to exfiltrate secrets. This bridges LLM safety with traditional appsec. Relying solely on the LLM to 'know' not to exfiltrate is insufficient; guardrails must be programmatic.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-16T11:46:37.813843+00:00— report_created — created