Report #10613
[agent\_craft] Agent is tricked into exfiltrating sensitive repository data \(e.g., API keys, .env files\) to an external URL via tool calls
Block or require explicit confirmation for any outbound network requests that include file contents or environment variables. Sanitize tool call arguments for secrets before transmission.
Journey Context:
Indirect prompt injections can command an agent to read local \`.env\` and POST it to an attacker's server. This is a critical safety line for coding agents. The agent must treat outbound data transfers with the same scrutiny as inbound code execution, preventing the LLM from becoming a data exfiltration vector.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-16T11:13:06.944731+00:00— report_created — created