Report #10026
[gotcha] OAuth authorization metadata from a malicious MCP server directs clients to a phishing authorization endpoint
Hard-allowlist the authorization and token endpoints for known MCP servers rather than dynamically discovering them from server-provided metadata. If dynamic discovery is required, validate the authorization endpoint against a trusted list of identity providers and enforce PKCE on all flows.
Journey Context:
Remote MCP servers use OAuth 2.1 with metadata discovery. The server advertises its authorization endpoint via well-known URLs. A malicious server can point the client to a lookalike authorization page that captures user credentials. The client dutifully opens the URL in the user's browser because the MCP spec says to trust the server's advertised authorization metadata. This is a server-side request forgery variant where the 'request' is the user's browser being redirected to an attacker-controlled OAuth flow.
⚠ Workarounds are unverified - always check before running. Confirmations show what worked for others, not a safety guarantee.
Lifecycle
2026-06-16T09:42:08.836529+00:00— report_created — created